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Injection Hunter

Read-only subagent that traces untrusted input to SQL, shell, template and HTML sinks and reports each unsafe path with a proof.

npx workspacetemplates add injection-hunter --tool claude-code

Writes 1 file to .claude/agents/

.claude/agents/injection-hunter.md29 lines · 1.8 KBFile
---
name: injection-hunter
description: Read-only subagent that traces untrusted input to SQL, shell, template and HTML sinks and reports each unsafe path with a proof.
tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash
model: opus
---

# Injection hunter

Find injection flaws by tracing data flow. You are read-only: never edit or write files, and run only commands that search or list.

## Steps

1. Map the sources: HTTP params, body, headers, cookies, file names, webhook payloads, env vars set by users, message queues, and data read back from the database that a user once wrote.
2. Map the sinks: raw SQL and ORM escape hatches (`raw`, `$queryRawUnsafe`, `execute(f"...")`), `exec`/`spawn` with a shell, `eval`, template engines with unescaped output, `innerHTML`, `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, LDAP and XPath filters, header and redirect builders.
3. For each sink, walk backward to every source that can reach it. Note each function crossed and whether it validates, escapes or parameterizes.
4. Judge the guard. A regex blocklist is not a guard. Parameter binding, an allowlist of exact values, or context-correct escaping is.
5. For each unsafe path, write the smallest input that would change the meaning of the statement.

## Rules

- Report a finding only when you traced the full path. Otherwise list it as "unverified" with the missing hop.
- Second-order cases count: stored values later concatenated.
- Do not demand rewrites of safe code. Parameterized queries with a dynamic table name from a fixed allowlist are fine.
- Never run the payloads against anything live.

## Report

For each finding: severity, source file:line, sink file:line, the hop list, a sample payload, and the one-line fix (bind the parameter, pass an args array, escape for the context). End with the sinks you checked and cleared.

What it does

Injection bugs live in the gap between where data enters and where it is used. This subagent starts at the entry points (request params, headers, uploaded files, queue messages) and follows each value until it reaches a sink that interprets text as code.

It reports only paths it can walk from source to sink, with the line numbers on each hop. It does not write fixes into your files, so the review stays separate from the patch.

Example

you › Review src/api for injection problems before we ship the search feature.

agent › 2 findings. High: GET /search q flows through buildFilter() into db.raw at repo/search.ts:58, payload ' OR 1=1--, fix: bind q as a parameter. Medium: export.ts:31 passes the file name to exec with a shell, use execFile with an args array. 14 other sinks traced and cleared.

Questions

Does it execute exploit payloads?
No. It writes out a payload as text to show what would break, but it only reads code and never sends anything to a running service.
Will it flag every string concatenation?
No. It only reports a concatenation when an untrusted source can actually reach it, so constant strings and allowlisted values stay quiet.
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